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ABSTRACT
First responders need appropriate measurement technologies for evaluating 
incident scenes. This report provides information about photoionization detectors 
(PIDs), obtained from manufacturers and independent laboratory tests, and the 
use of PIDs by first responders, obtained from incident commanders in the 
United States and Canada. PIDs are valued for their relatively low cost, light 
weight, rapid detection response, and ease of use. However, it is clear that further 
efforts are needed to provide suitable instruments and decision tools to incident 
commanders and first responders for assessing potential hazardous chemical 
releases. Information provided in this report indicates that PIDs should always be 
part of a decision-making context in which other qualitative and more definitive 
tests and instruments are used to confirm a finding. Possible amelioratory actions 
ranging from quick and relatively easy fixes to those requiring significant 
additional effort are outlined in the report. 
iv
vSUMMARY 
In support of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Standards 
Portfolio, a team of the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), Neptune and Company, 
and SAIC were asked to provide “Support in developing an easy to use, 
consumer report style performance assessment of existing measurement 
technologies, to include identifying critical data gaps that hinder our ability to 
report on a specific performance characteristic for a potentially promising 
technology.” As a result of discussions with the client and first-hand information 
from users, it was decided to focus on photoionization detectors (PIDs), which are 
commonly used by first responders to detect chemical vapors.  
Incident commanders (ICs) from the United States and one from Canada were 
interviewed to learn how well PIDs meet their first response needs. In brief, we 
learned that 
x False negative findings are a critical metric for ICs. (False positives will 
sort themselves out in follow-up analyses.) 
x Instrument manufacturers have sometimes oversold the capabilities of their 
instruments, resulting in the purchase of ineffective or inadequate 
instrumentation.
x Additional, independent, third-party evaluation of instrument capabilities is 
needed to establish how well PIDs work in first-response scenarios. 
x ICs would like instruments specifically designed to meet first responder 
needs and specifications. (Current instruments were originally designed for 
other purposes.)
x Fertilizer/fuel bombs and large volume transporters of chlorine gas, 
gasoline, and other fuels are of more concern to ICs than exotic chemicals 
such as chemical warfare agents (CWAs). 
PIDs are valued for their relatively low cost, light weight, rapid detection 
response, and ease of use. We contacted PID manufacturers for information 
about their instruments and reviewed the findings from an independent 
performance evaluation of selected PIDs. The independent laboratory evaluation 
generally matches the experience of users in the field but is not always consistent 
with the manufacturer’s stated capabilities of their equipment. 
Information provided in this report indicates that PIDs should always be 
part of a decision-making context in which other qualitative and more definitive 
tests and instruments are used to confirm a finding. The performance of PIDs, as 
observed by users and quantified by independent testing, may affect the ability to 
make correct field decisions. Many variables influence PID performance and thus 
decisions based on instrument findings. Therefore, it is strongly encouraged that 
a decision flow process approach, such as outlined in this report, be used by first 
responders.
vi
Additional actions DHS may wish to pursue include 
x Refined listing of chemical constituents that DHS wants to prepare for 
emergency response 
x Develop a user decision context for PID use in the field  
x Expand the decision context for PIDs to other instruments and decision 
scenarios
x Train DHS decision makers, incident commanders and first responders in 
the use of these decision tools with specific field instruments
x Plan independent instrument performance validation tests with 
interpretation and reporting of the results  
x Provide independent validation testing of instruments for known chemical 
constituents of concern 
x Develop chemical standards at varying concentrations and with appropriate 
matrix to demonstrate, in real time, the instrument performance in the field 
x Develop and implement components of a decision-based and value-added 
quality assurance system to support field decision makers. 
vii
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is interested in assuring that first responders have 
appropriate measurement technologies for evaluating incident scenes. To that end, a team from Idaho 
National Laboratory (INL), Neptune and Company, and SAIC was asked to provide “Support in 
developing an easy to use, consumer report style performance assessment of existing measurement 
technologies, to include identifying critical data gaps that hinder our ability to report on a specific 
performance characteristic for a potentially promising technology.” After discussions with DHS, the focus 
turned to chemical vapor detectors, first-hand information from their users, and independent test results. 
Incident commanders (ICs) representing cities of various sizes or regional areas from across the United 
States and one from Canada were contacted. The ICs provided their professional, but subjective, 
perspectives on instruments used and how well these instruments met their first response needs. Based on 
their input, a decision was made to investigate only photoionization detectors (PIDs). These field safety 
tools, valued for their relatively low cost, light weight, rapid detection response, and ease of use, are 
commonly used by first responders. 
This report briefly describes what PIDs are and how they can be used at an incident scene, gives 
manufacturer’s data about PIDs, presents data from independent tests, and summarizes the interviews 
with the incident commanders. 
22. BACKGROUND 
PIDs are typically used in first responder scenarios to give preliminary information about a variety 
of chemicals. Table 1 lists some chemical warfare agents (CWAs) and toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) 
that are important to first responders. Many of the time-weighted averages (TWAs) and lethal 
concentrations (LC-50) for these gases are at the ppm and sub-ppm level, driving the need for sensitivity 
in a first responder instrument. As noted in the table, some important chemicals are not detected by PIDs, 
including hydrogen cyanide and chlorine gas. 
PIDs generally function in a broad concentration range, with some being linear from less than 1 to 
300 ppmv. Higher concentrations can be reached under ideal conditions. Only a small fraction of the 
analyte molecules are actually ionized in the PID chamber. Consequently, analyte gas can be taken from 
the exhaust port of the PID and connected to another detector for confirmatory or subsequent analysis. 
2.1 Description of PIDs 
A photoionization detector is a field instrument that is relatively simple and easy to use. It provides 
rapid information about volatile organic compounds (VOCs) in air samples. Stand-alone PIDs are usually 
classified as a total organic vapor (TOV) analytical method. That is, they provide information about the 
relative magnitude of contamination, but are unable to directly distinguish specific compounds. Another 
common type of TOV instrument is the flame ionization detector (FID). Although both PID and FID 
technologies can be used for gas chromatography, PIDs were only investigated as stand-alone detectors. 
The critical component of a PID is a lamp, which produces photons in the ultraviolet (UV) energy range. 
The sample is collected by a small air pump and introduced into the PID where it passes in front of the 
lamp and is exposed to the UV radiation. Atoms and molecules in the sample that have an ionization 
potential (IP) lower than the energy of the UV lamp are ionized with some efficiency. An electric field 
then pulls ions to the appropriate electrode where a current can be measured. See Figure 1 for a diagram 
of a PID instrument. 
The instrument response in PIDs is related to an electric current generated by a photoionized 
molecular ion from the compound. Compounds with higher IPs, such as aliphatics, require more energy 
for ionization. Other compounds, such as aromatics, have lower IPs and require less energy for ionization. 
The specific wavelength (energy) of the UV lamp determines which compounds can be ionized. To 
bracket typical compounds, UV lamps in a PID range in energy from 8.4 to 11.7 eV. 
The critical part of a PID is the lamp. These lamps come in different sizes, but most have the shape 
of an ampoule. The lamp is filled with a low-pressure inert gas that specifies the energy of ultraviolet 
radiation produced. For example, krypton gas emits 123.9 nm and 116.9 nm radiation, which matches IPs 
of 10 eV and 10.6 eV, respectively. The 10.6 eV lamp is a common choice in PIDs. Other gases, such as 
argon and xenon, produce other wavelengths that correspond to other IPs. Basic lamp requirements 
include a relatively high voltage, a stable source over time, and low power consumption. Older lamp 
designs had internal electrodes, but more recent lamps do not have internal electrodes. In these lamps, the 
low-pressure inert gas enclosed in the lamp must be excited by an outside energy source through the lamp 
wall. This is often accomplished via electrodes placed on the exterior wall of the lamp. These electrodes 
have a high-voltage, low-current charge with sufficient energy to excite the gas inside the lamp. 
Windows must transmit light; however, many materials absorb in the UV energy range interfering 
with or preventing light transmission and cannot be used as windows for PID detectors. Crystals, such as 
sapphire, have good transmission in the UV region and can be used as window material. Magnesium 
fluoride glass windows work well with the krypton gas 10.6 eV lamps, while lithium fluoride windows 
work well with argon gas 11.7 eV lamps. Both magnesium fluoride and lithium fluoride make a soft glass 
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Figure 1. Schematic of a PID. 
that is fragile and expensive. These materials are also hygroscopic, making the window susceptible to 
degradation. Other window materials are also sometimes used. A PID lamp requires frequent cleaning 
because it is directly exposed to the sample stream and is easily fouled by gases and particles in the air. 
The periodic cleaning limits the life of the lamp. 
Typical lamp energies include 11.7 eV, 10.6 eV, 9.5 eV, and 8.4 eV, with lamps being 
interchangeable within an instrument. The lamp energies match with the energy needed to ionize typical 
analytes. The 9.5 eV lamp detects benzene, aromatic compounds, and amines. Switching to the 10.6 eV 
lamp adds detection of ammonia, ethanol, and acetone. Installing the 11.7 eV lamp adds acetylene, 
formaldehyde, and methanol. Each lamp only ionizes the chemicals that have IPs lower than its rated 
energy. Changing lamps for analysis of an unknown air sample can bracket the IP of the unknown. The 
common components of air, such as nitrogen, oxygen, helium, carbon dioxide, and water vapor, all have 
IPs higher than 11.7 eV and are not ionized and are not detected. 
2.2 Information from PIDs 
The response of a PID depends upon the absorption cross section of the molecule, ionization 
efficiency, and molar concentration of the compound in question. Within a homologous series where IP is 
related to carbon number, there is also a relationship between PID response and carbon number. The PID 
response for different compounds with the same carbon number can vary considerably depending upon 
the IP. Because the instrument response in PIDs is related to a generated electric current, PID response 
can be affected by high electrical fields (e.g., power lines). PIDs can operate in conditions of high relative 
humidity and low O2, but they require a calibration gas that approximates the analysis conditions. 
When a chemical constituent is ionized by a PID, it yields a current or response. This response is a 
characteristic property of a specific chemical constituent that is influenced by its molecular structure. The 
slope of the response curve is different for different chemicals. To properly report the concentration for a 
given chemical constituent, the detector uses individual response factors. PIDs are typically calibrated 
with isobutylene—it is stable, relatively easy to handle, easily available, and can be stored at high 
pressure. Instrument responses for other gases are obtained by multiplying the reading by a correction 
factor that takes into account response relative to isobutylene. Instrument manufacturers typically supply 
a list of correction factors with their product. However, the correction factors are not an absolute scale, 
and they vary between manufacturers, between lamps, and with the quality of the lamp for the same 
6instrument. Therefore, for accurate readings on specific gases, it is necessary to calibrate each gas 
individually. 
If the sample gas contains other compounds that can form ions, and if the IPs of these compounds 
are higher than the output of the lamp, then the UV radiation can be scattered and absorbed. This is 
typically referred to as quenching because it reduces the signal. In air sampling, quench gases include 
water vapor, carbon dioxide, methane, and carbon monoxide. 
PIDs can be extremely sensitive to the composition of the sampled gas, which adversely affects 
their sensitivity. Common problems include vapors from fuels and partial combustion products from 
burning materials. These conditions can produce unwanted vapor phase chemicals, aerosols, and small 
particles in the sampled air. Lamp effectiveness can be limited and the analyte signal can be altered by 
charge competition. These are not trivial issues for first responders. 
2.3 Role of PIDs in Field Decisions 
PIDs offer a rapid and convenient indication of whether volatile chemical constituents are present 
in the air. Consequently, PIDs are among the instruments and tests typically used by first responders in 
the early phase of a field investigation when harmful volatile compounds may be present. PID 
information begins the evaluation of the potential threat and helps guide measures for protection of field 
personnel. The PID provides suggestive, not definitive, information about whether a site has been 
compromised. This information supports decisions about the potential presence or absence of compounds 
of concern, but cannot be relied upon to identify or quantify a particular compound. As discussed above, 
PIDs are subject to false positive and false negative errors, in part because of potential interferences from 
naturally occurring conditions such as smoke and dust. The site-specific effectiveness of a PID depends in 
large part on whether it has been calibrated appropriately for site conditions and potential chemical 
threats.
Figure 2 depicts the typical decision logic for preliminary evaluation of a suspected threat or 
incident with a potential to release volatile chemical constituents into the air. The diagram addresses two 
key early decisions: is the threat possible, and is the threat credible? A possible threat is one in which the 
circumstances of a threat warning appear to have provided an opportunity for contamination. This is the 
lowest threshold in the threat evaluation process and the point at which a decision is made whether to 
proceed with the investigation. A threat warning is an unusual event, observation, or discovery that 
indicates the potential for contamination. It may involve a detected security breach, a witness account, 
direct notification by an alleged perpetrator, an observed catastrophic event, or other means of discovery. 
A decision about a possible threat is typically made speedily on the basis of already available information. 
However, a PID may be employed at this early point for the safety of first responders. Thus, the Incident 
Commander may have access to initial PID results while making the initial determination of whether the 
threat is possible. 
If the threat is determined to be possible, the typical course of action is to screen for chemical 
constituents at the scene, while at the same time considering an interim operational response (such as 
evacuating those living or working in the vicinity). Based on interviews with a number of incident 
commanders (see Section 4 below), a PID is widely considered to be a key element of this 
characterization effort, perhaps in conjunction with other field instruments. Its purpose is to determine 
very rapidly whether volatile compounds of interest can be detected in the vicinity. A positive PID 
response would typically be immediately followed by use of a more specific screening instrument or test 
(e.g., Draeger tubes or color spot test), and possibly by collection and analysis of vapor samples by gas 
chromatography or other more definitive techniques to identify what volatile gases are present and 
estimate their concentration. 
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Figure 2. Decision flow diagram for generic preliminary threat evaluation. 
The information collected during screening is combined with previously available information to 
support decision-making about the credibility of the threat. At this point the incident commander may also 
have access to relevant information from external sources (such as law enforcement authorities), or 
perspective based on evaluation of previous similar security incidents. A credible threat is one in which 
information collected during preliminary threat evaluation corroborates information from the initial threat 
warning. If the threat is determined to be credible, then the typical path forward is to conduct 
confirmatory chemical constituent characterization of the site, possibly combined with a public health 
response. The goal of confirmatory characterization is to determine exactly which compounds are present 
and at what concentration. At this stage, continued use of a PID would likely be limited to site worker 
health and safety support, while other more definitive measurement methods would be used to guide 
subsequent decisions related to the threat and the extent of the threat. 
83. COMMERCIAL PIDS 
3.1 Performance Data from Manufacturers 
Given the widespread use of PIDs by first responders faced with possible vapor threats, an effort 
was made to obtain a variety of data from PID manufacturers that could be used to compare and contrast 
available instruments. PID manufacturers were initially identified in the Responder Knowledge Base 
(http://www2.rkb.mipt.org/) of the National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT). 
This Web site listed 14 PID instruments under their authorized equipment list (dated 2004). The Web site 
provides summary information about these instruments and links to the manufacturers’ Web sites. Some 
agencies allow only authorized instruments to be purchased using grant monies. A few additional 
instruments were subsequently identified through Internet searches. The instrument manufacturers were 
then contacted to obtain information beyond that readily available online. No claim is made that all PID 
instruments were identified, or that identified instruments represent the best available. Appendix A 
contains the questions posed to each of the manufacturers contacted for this study and a comprehensive 
summary of the information obtained from them and reviewing from online brochures and manuals; a 
brief summary of the key features of the PIDs is presented in Table 2. 
To assist in qualitatively comparing instruments, a subset of physical and performance data is 
presented in a “Consumer Report” style table (Table 3). Four categories were developed for most 
indicators, with a solid circle being the highest rating and an open circle the lowest; criteria used for 
scoring are presented below the table. No attempt has been made to re-contact manufacturers to verify 
that the information provided was correctly interpreted and all categories were based strictly on judgment, 
with the intent of displaying differences observed, without claiming these differences are critical from the 
standpoint of use by first responders. In other words, while there was a view of quality of performance in 
context of a specific use, such analyses are beyond the scope of this effort. Instead, the potential value of 
condensing information in this manner to assist ICs in selecting appropriate devises for their specific uses 
was demonstrated. 
Table 2. Key features of PIDs as reported by their manufacturers. 
Manufacturer and Model Key features 
Aerion Technologies, AIM 450 PID None reported 
GrayWolf Sensing Solutions, Direct Sense 
TVOC-ppm Multi-Gas PID Monitor 
Low price 
Extended battery life for field applications is available 
Dynamic range from ppb to 5,000 ppm 
Multigas and PID detector 
GrayWolf Sensing Solutions, Direct Sense 
TVOC-ppb Multi-Gas PID Monitor 
Similar features with a dynamic range from 20 ppb to 
20 ppm 
Industrial Scientific, VX500 Photo 
Ionization Detector 
Low price 
Tested durability 
Minimal response time 
Dynamic range from ppb to 5,000 ppm 
Ion Science, First Check 6000 PID plus Multigas and PID detector, capable of analysis of VOCs 
and O2, CO, H2S, and LEL 
Dynamic range from ppb to 10,000 ppm 
Minimal response time 
Tested durability 
Table 2. (continued). 
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Manufacturer and Model Key features 
Ion Science, First Check 5000 PID Similar features, but is used only for VOCs 
Mine Safety Applications, Sirius Multigas 
Detector
Dynamic range of ppb to 2,000 ppm 
Tested durability 
Multigas and PID detector, capable of analysis of VOCs 
and O2, CO, H2S and LEL 
Photovac, 2020PRO Photoionization 
Monitor
Dynamic range of 0.1–2000 ppm 
PID Analyzers, Model 102 PID analyzer Dynamic range of 0.1–3000 ppm 
RAE Systems, Area RAE Dynamic range of 0.1–2000 ppm 
Tested durability 
PID detector, tested and capable of analysis of 17 of 18 
TICs as tested by Longworth et al. (1999, 2001) 
Field battery life longer than most field instruments, 
reported by manufacturer as 18 hours 
Multigas and PID detector, capable of analysis of VOCs 
and O2, CO, H2S, SO2, NO, NO2, Cl2, HCN, NH3, PH3, and 
LEL
RAE Systems, MiniRAE 2000 Dynamic range of 0.1–10000 ppm. This instrument is 
capable of detecting higher concentrations than most 
instruments without detector saturation 
Tested durability 
Low price 
RAE Systems, ToxiRAE Plus PID Dynamic range of 0.1–2000 ppm 
Tested durability 
Very low price 
RAE Systems, ppb RAE Dynamic range of 0.001–2000 ppm. This dynamic range is 
lower and provides a greater span than most other field 
PIDs
Tested durability 
Average battery life 
RAE Systems, MultiRAE plus Dynamic range of 0.1–2000 ppm 
Low price 
Tested durability 
Multigas and PID detector, capable of analysis of VOCs 
and O2, CO, H2S, SO2, NO, NO2, Cl2, HCN, NH3, PH3, and 
LEL
Thermo Electron, Photovac 2020 PID 
Monitor
Dynamic range of 0.5–2000 ppm 
Thermo Electron, TVA-1000B Toxic Vapor 
Analyzer 
Dynamic range of 0.1–2000 ppm 
High precision instrument as reported by manufacturer 
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Table 3. Comparison of manufacturer’s data for PID instruments. 
Manufacturer Instrument Model Pr
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Aerion Technologies AIM 450 PID ND ND ND ND 
GrayWolf Sensing 
Solutions
Direct Sense TVOC-ppm Multi-
Gas PID Monitor ND ND $3,995 
GrayWolf Sensing 
Solutions
Direct Sense TVOC-ppb Multi-Gas 
PID Monitor ND ND $3,995 
Industrial Scientific VX500 Photo Ionization Detector ND $2,995 
Ion Science FirstCheck 6000 $6,995 
Ion Science FirstCheck 5000 $5,995 
Mine Safety Appliances Sirius Multigas Detector ND ND ND 
Photovac 2020PRO Photoionization Monitor ND ND 
PID Analyzers Model 102 PID analyzer ND ND ND 
RAE Systems Area RAE $6,000 
RAE Systems MiniRAE 2000 $3,245 
RAE Systems ToxiRAE Plus PID $1,450 
RAE Systems ppbRAE $6,000 
RAE Systems MultiRAE Plus $3,000 
Thermo Electron Photovac 2020 PID Monitor ND ND 
Thermo Electron TVA-1000B Toxic Vapor Analyzer ND ND ND 
Key:
Precision   +/- 0.5 ppm or 
2 ppm or 10% 
+/-40 ppb or 10% and 5% 
Dynamic Range  0.02–20 ppm  0.1–5000, 
0.02–20 ppm,  
0.5–2,000, 
0.1–3,000 ppm 
0.001–2,000 
0.1 to 100,000 ppm 
Response Time >1 min 21–30 sec 6–20 sec 1–5 sec 
Weight >8 lbs. 4–8 lbs. 2–<4 lbs. 0.5–<2 lbs. 
Battery Life <8 hrs 8 hrs 10–18 hrs 180 hrs 
Cost >$6000 $4000–6000 $1500–3999 <$1500 
ND: No data available in manufacturer’s response 
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A quick review of Table 3 shows that all instruments, as reported by their manufacturers, look 
quite good. Dynamic range is a discriminator, with two instruments capable of measuring constituents in 
the lower ppb ranges while most cover high ppb to ppm ranges. Cost ranged from $1.5K to $7K. Battery 
life for most instruments was roughly 1–2 days, while one instrument claimed 180 hours. Most 
instruments were very light and portable, with two exceptions that weighed more than 8 pounds. It is not 
clear if all specifications include battery weight, are calling this comparison into question. 
3.2 Independent Evaluation of PIDs 
Two independent scientific studies authorized by the Expert Assistance (Equipment Test) Program 
for the U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command Program for Domestic Preparedness were 
conducted to evaluate the use of PIDs and other instruments for the detection of CWAs (Longworth et al. 
1999 and 2001). These studies involved rigorous laboratory experimental evaluation of the detectors’ 
performance testing a range of commercially available instruments, many of which were manufactured by 
the same manufacturers as those reported in this document. The results of these studies tell a very 
different story than that told by performance data provided by manufacturers. Since those studies, 
manufacturers have updated PID designs, changed model numbers, and produced new PIDs. None of the 
models identified in this report match with those tested. However, the results of those studies are still 
useful in a general sense for evaluation of PIDs. 
Longworth et al. evaluated the performance of the detection devices for three warfare agents 
(Tabun, Sarin, and Mustard) at different concentrations in a range of temperatures and humidities. Four 
PIDs were tested in 1999; in 2001, multiple units of a single instrument designed to detect constituents at 
ppb levels were evaluated. This work evaluated the performance of instruments before and after exposure 
to warfare agents and looked at the effect of various commonly occurring volatiles to evaluate the 
potential for interference in detecting the agents of concern. 
General conclusions of these studies are summarized below. 
x UV lamps became easily contaminated by dust, dirt, moisture. and residue during use 
x To maintain performance, extensive and frequent cleaning was required, which was considered 
impractical in the face of a terrorist threat 
x PIDs were not considered reliable detectors for detecting CWAs due to the significantly degraded 
performance once exposed to vapors of CWAs or other substances 
x None of the instruments tested, including the instrument designed to detect VOCs at ppb levels, 
were capable of reliably detecting all three agents at levels of concern 
x There was significant variability within units of the same model. 
Longworth et al. concluded that due to the poor performance of the selected instruments, further 
testing would be of little or no value. It is important to note that these studies focused on CWAs, for 
which instrument sensitivity and consistent performance in the presence of potential interferences, and 
across a wide range of temperatures and humidities is critical. These tests did not evaluate the 
performance for the wide range of industrial chemicals that are also considered potential agents for 
terrorist activities and many of which do not require detection at very low concentrations to protect public 
health. Nevertheless, the Longworth et al. studies emphasize the need for Homeland Security to develop 
and implement a comprehensive and rigorous testing program to provide objective information to support 
ICs in selecting and maintaining appropriate instrumentation for detection of vapor chemical threats. 
12
4. SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW RESPONSES 
FROM INCIDENT COMMANDERS 
To better understand the incident commanders’ perspectives on instrumentation available for 
measurement of vapor threats, ICs across the United States and one from Canada were interviewed. The 
initial questions posed to them related to instrumentation they have available for use in response to a 
potential terrorist incident involving CWAs released into the air. Next were questions about the incident 
scene and decision-making process. Finally, questions were asked about maintenance and training issues. 
In summary, the interviews revealed that:
x A critical metric for ICs is false negative findings. ICs have indicated that false positives will sort 
themselves out, as follow-up analyses are always necessary to evaluate a finding importance. 
x Instrument manufacturers’ have sometimes oversold the capabilities of their instruments, resulting 
in the purchase of ineffective or inadequate instrumentation. Independent, third-party evaluation of 
instrument capabilities is an important need. 
x Instruments used by first responders were originally designed for other purposes. ICs would like to 
see instruments specifically designed to meet first responder needs and specifications. 
x Exotic chemicals such as CWAs (e.g., VX, GB, mustard) are viewed as a less likely terrorist threat 
than fertilizer/fuel bombs and large volume transporters of chlorine gas, gasoline, and other fuels. 
The individual questions posed are listed below, followed by a short summary of the responses 
focusing on responses that pertain to the use of PIDs. Appendix B gives the complete responses of each 
IC. These agencies and ICs are: 
x Charlotte, North Carolina, Fire Department, Chief Luther Fincher 
x Dallas, Texas, Fire Department, Chiefs Steve Abraira and Eddie Burns, Jr. 
x Fairfax County Battalion, Chief Bill MacKay, Incident Commander 
x Idaho Falls, Idaho, Fire Department and Regional HAZMAT Response Team, Captain John Lund 
x Los Angeles County, California, Fire Department , Deputy Chief Michael Bryant 
x Raton, New Mexico, Fire and Emergency Services, Chief Dave A. Pasquale 
x San Diego, California, Fire Department , Chief Jeff Bowman 
x Washington, D.C., Fire Department, Lieutenant John Donnelly 
x Winnipeg, Canada, Fire Paramedic Service, Chief W. H. (Wes) Shoemaker, Deputy Chief Ken 
Sim. 
4.1 Technical Questions on Instrumentation 
1. What vapor detection instruments and tests do you currently use? 
A variety of instruments are available to ICs for use in responding to potential vapor threats. PIDs 
were listed by most ICs as a critical first responder tool. Their typical use is for initial detection of 
unknowns—PIDs are used upon first entry to a potentially contaminated area. ICs indicated that 
positive findings must be further analyzed to determine the volatile constituent that caused the 
positive finding. 
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2. Do these instruments or tests provide the data you need to make decisions about 
an incident? Name any specific shortcomings of the instruments. 
Generally, ICs were concerned about the non-specificity of instruments such as PIDs, the 
possibility that false positives could be triggered by non-target analytes, battery life for long-term 
events, and lifespan and maintenance of bulbs. Several ICs noted that false positive findings 
require that more definitive tests be done and eventually sort themselves out, but at a cost of 
additional resources and time. Most ICs look upon PIDs as only one part of an overall strategy for 
evaluating a threat. 
3. Do they provide more data than needed? Could they be simpler? 
ICs provided a range of responses to this question. Many feel the information provided is 
adequate and the instruments simple enough to be effective. Some feel the instrumentation 
provides more than is required and they could be simpler. Others recognize that while they may 
not need the information, others in the response group do. Some instruments include safety levels 
that are not pertinent to first responders and this feature cannot be easily turned off. 
4. What additional information regarding instrumentation or a test do you want or 
need that you are currently not receiving, e.g., test sensitivity, F (-) or F (+) rate, 
etc.?
Additional information that needs to be identified by ICs includes a desire to definitively 
determine what contaminants are present and the capabilities for detecting radionuclides. No 
specific comments were made about the adequacy of detection capabilities or sensitivity of the 
instruments; however, many comments were made about large false positive rates, and one 
respondent was candid about manufacturers’ overselling the capabilities of their instruments and 
the need for networking to determine what the capabilities really are. 
5. What actions or procedures are performed or implemented that seem unique to 
your organization for chemical sensing? 
Most ICs indicated that while chemical warfare agents are of concern, they are more concerned 
about common industrial chemicals such as chlorine gas or various fuels (e.g., due to proximity of 
large rail yards). 
6. Are there media (e.g., air, water, soil) for which you do not have instrumentation or 
test kits, or their “performance” is insufficient, or the instrument or test is too 
complex for field use? 
IC responses varied from an indication that there are no media for which they do not have 
instrumentation to responses indicating media are not well covered by available instrumentation. 
Some ICs felt that some devices, such as Draeger tubes, were too complex for initial tests. Others 
indicated they are unable to evaluate water or to test for pathogens such as anthrax or warfare 
agents such as Sarin without outside help. 
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4.2 Incident Scene Questions 
1. What actions do you or your organization take with a positive instrument or test 
finding and likewise with a negative finding? 
Positive tests are generally treated by ICs as an indication that action is required to evacuate and 
control access to the affected area and implement other precautionary measures. If Homeland 
Security threats are present, collaboration with other agencies is common. Follow-up sampling 
and analysis are also conducted with different methods following positive test results. Negative 
tests are treated cautiously—false negatives are of great concern. Follow-up sampling and 
analysis after a negative result is not well defined. 
2. What follow-up steps are taken to avoid the possibility of a false positive or false 
negative?
Some ICs use follow-up testing or parallel testing with multiple instruments, as well as 
information about the nature of the threat, to address the probability of making an incorrect 
decision. Others have no plan. 
3. Based on initial incident situation reports, how do first responders in your 
organization choose the appropriate level and type of personal protective 
equipment, instruments, and test kits to bring into the field? 
Most ICs indicated that the highest level of personal protective equipment (PPE) is used to 
address credible threats, but initial instrument readings also play an important role in PPE 
selection. Sometimes data obtained en route to the site were used for PPE selection; however, 
standard procedures seem to be in place and involve assuming the worst-case scenario. 
4. Do you have a procedure for when your testing equipment finds nothing, but it is 
obvious there is something amiss e.g., sick or dead individuals? 
Responses ranged from lack of standard protocols, to use of common sense, to formal protocols 
for securing the site and calling in help from other agencies. 
4.3 Decision Making Questions 
1. Do you participate in a formal or informal network of ICs in communities, states, 
or regions for information exchange regarding instrumentation or test 
performance, reliability, and utility? 
Both informal and formal communication networks are in place in various locations, but nothing 
uniform across state, county, and federal agencies. As far as instrumentation, the primary source 
of information seems to be word of mouth, or casual discussions. Indications are that while 
sources of information such as conferences, courses, and trade magazines are available, there is 
no uniformly used mechanism for exchanging or sharing information, data, or experiences. 
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2. Are specifications for detecting chemical agents standard from a national source 
or do you have the prerogative to select instruments or tests according to your 
specifications?
Several respondents indicated they have a national source for specifications for detecting 
chemical agents and selecting instruments. Others indicated they have flexibility to select 
instruments based on what they believe will meet their needs. 
3. Do you have performance or data quality information on your instruments? 
It would appear that most respondents rely on instrument manufacturers to provide information 
on instrument performance. Only one of the ICs indicated that they perform their own testing; 
most rely on tests performed by laboratories such as Edgewood. 
4. Who or what process determines if more in-depth agent analysis is needed at an 
incident scene? 
In most cases, the incident commander, in consultation with other agencies, is responsible for 
making this call. 
5. What is the source of more in-depth analysis? Local, State, Federal, or National 
Lab?
Responses ranged from state, local, or public health laboratories, or even the FBI, to candid 
statements that the source to turn to for more in-depth analyses is unknown or ad hoc. One 
responder felt that there should be a coordinated network. 
6. What data are needed to make the decision to get more in depth analysis? What 
more could an instrument provide? 
Most responders indicated that the IC makes the decision to get more in-depth analysis and no 
one instrument would be considered adequate to provide the needed information. Biopathogens 
are clearly of concern with respect to the capabilities of existing field instrumentation. 
4.4 Maintenance and Training Questions 
1. Is there a program in place in your organization for replacement of obsolete 
instrumentation or testing kits and equipment to ensure it is not beyond the 
usable shelf life or to ensure that it is properly maintained? 
In all cases, there is a program in place to evaluate when to replace or repair instruments, and to 
maintain their own instruments. Most rely on the manufacturer’s recommendations to support this 
program. 
2. Do you have non-toxic challenge agent materials (effective surrogates) and/or 
quantitative standards to evaluate instrument or test performance on a routine 
basis?
Calibration gases (in particular, hydrocarbons) and manufacturer-supplied standards are generally 
used; one respondent indicated that for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) agents, non-toxic 
challenge agents are available. 
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3. Other than users’ manuals, are there training courses for the operation of 
instruments or conduct of tests in your organization and user proficiency 
standards, demonstrations, or evaluations? 
All ICs indicated that they have training programs in place, some of which is provided by the 
instrument manufacturers. General HAZMAT training is also in place. 
4. Do you have the knowledge to provide confidence in choosing instruments or 
tests to have on hand and decide which is appropriate for the situation at hand? 
In most cases, ICs feel confident they have the expertise and knowledge required and have 
purchased and supplied a good array of instruments to their first responders. Others admit they 
have purchased some instruments that have not lived up to their expectations and they desire 
more objective data to help them. It is not clear whether the answers pertain to readiness for 
warfare agents or for more common industrial chemical spills and responses. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSED NEXT STEPS 
Incident commanders faced with possible hazardous chemical releases have very specific 
perspectives regarding their data needs and the instrument performance required to obtain these data. 
Their requirements, together with the discrepancies between manufacturers’ instrument performance 
specifications and a limited third-party evaluation of PID performance, indicate a need for further efforts 
to provide suitable instruments and decision tools to incident commanders and first responders.  
Given these findings, it appears that field personnel may not be fully prepared to make decisions as 
to hazards in the field and necessary actions to evaluate these hazards. Possible amelioratory actions range 
from quick and relatively easy fixes to efforts requiring significant additional effort. The following are 
possible follow-up actions to address these shortcomings:  
x Refine the listing of chemical constituents to be addressed. Collect additional information about 
PID use for these chemicals. 
x Compile standard procedures to complement the focus list of chemical constituents 
x Develop a user decision context for PID use in the field  
x Expand the decision context for PIDs to other instruments and decision scenarios 
x Train DHS decision makers, incident commanders, and first responders in the use of these decision 
tools with specific field instruments  
x Plan independent instrument performance validation tests with interpretation and reporting of the 
results
x Develop chemical standards at varying concentrations to demonstrate in real time the instrument 
performance in the field to complement the focus list of chemical constituents 
x Develop and implement components of a decision-based and value-added quality assurance system 
to support field decision makers. 
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Appendix A 
Manufacturer’s Data for Responding Companies 
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Appendix A 
Manufacturer’s Data for Responding Companies 
This appendix presents the data gleaned from the manufacturer’s responses to questions regarding 
x Quantification limits and dynamic range of the instrument 
x Estimates of the False Positive and False Negative rates 
x Estimates of the expected precision and bias 
x Compounds detectable 
x Chemical or physical interferences 
x Response time 
x Temperature or humidity impacts on performance 
x Ease of use 
x Recording and reporting capabilities 
x Maintenance requirements 
x Standards provided with the instrument 
x Estimate of ruggedness 
x Ability to upgrade hardware and software 
x Customer support 
x Length of time to purchase 
x Level of standardization for hand held computers, laptops, etc. 
x Estimates of the field lifetime 
x Range of costs for basic instrument and options 
x Ability to decontaminate the instrument. 
The definitions listed below were used while developing the performance descriptions in 
Tables A-1 and A-2. Some of these definitions are not included as categories in the tables because 
manufacturers do not have data in these areas.  
Availability—Each vendor was asked how long it would take to obtain their PID. 
Cost—The manufacturer’s suggested retail cost for the basic instrument.
Customer Support—Type of training manuals, Web sites, technical assistance, or training courses offered 
by the manufacturer. 
Dynamic Range—The range of values for which contaminants will be detected and measured. Includes a 
defined lower level and upper level of instrument response.  
A-4
Ease of use—The skills and training required for proper device operation, including any specialized 
training required by the operators. Essentially all PIDs are reported as being easy to operate for first 
responders.
False Negative rate—Probability of the instrument failing to respond when the compound is present at or 
above the expected detection level. Without a controlled study, false negatives are difficult to 
quantify and any quantification under controlled conditions is likely to change in real-world 
matrices with multiple interferants. 
False Positive rate—Probability of the instrument providing a compound response when the compound is 
not present. If the instrument is susceptible to electronic drift, this may provide for a false positive 
finding. In PIDs, false positives are generally associated with the presence of a non-target analyte 
and are difficult to quantify. 
Field lifetime (battery, one-time use)—Operation time in the field based upon battery life. 
Interference complications—Interference causes problems with detection of the compounds of interest. 
This could be interference from other compounds, environmental conditions such as smoke or dust, 
or instrument background noise.  
Level of standardization—Compatibility of PID with standard interfaces and plugs. For example, does it 
plug into standard hand-held computers, laptops, etc.? Can it be used in conjunction with other 
devices?
Maintenance requirements—The maintenance needed for proper instrument operation. For example, the 
type of calibration and cleaning required. 
Performance in range of humidity—The relative humidity range in which the instrument performs well. 
May include a defined humidity level at which instrument performance deteriorates. 
Precision (variability, repeatability, etc.)—The degree of mutual agreement of independent measurements 
generated through repeated application of a process under specified conditions. Instrument 
precision is usually thought of as repeatability of a specific measurement and is often reported as 
relative standard deviation (RSD). 
Range of contaminants detected—Number of different contaminants detectable by the defined 
instrumentation and its set-up, e.g., lamp energy. Some contaminants of interest are listed in 
Table 1 of the report. 
Reporting capabilities—Format(s) for reporting data from the instrument. For example, can the 
instrument retain and periodically download data to databases by hard wire or wireless? Are 
standard computer graphics possible? 
Response Factor—When a chemical constituent is ionized by a photoionization detector, it yields a 
current or response. This response is a characteristic property of a specific constituent that is 
influenced by its molecular structure. Response factors are different for all chemicals and a PID is 
calibrated against a standard, such as isobutylene gas, thereby yielding a response that is 
automatically corrected to the standard response factor instead of the individual compound 
concentration.
Response time—The amount of time required to produce at least a 90% contaminant response. 
A-5
Ruggedness—Durability of the instrument. For example, are there likely device failures, what are the 
routine maintenance requirements and what type of repairs may be required? Has an instrument 
ruggedness test been performed? 
Sensitivity—Sensitivity is the ability of an instrument to discriminate between small differences in 
analyte concentration. It can be discussed in terms of an instrument detection limit (IDL), a method 
detection limit (MDL), and as a practical quantitation limit (PQL). This performance measure is the 
lower limit of the dynamic range. 
Upgradeability—Ability of the instrument to be upgraded to perform under a different set of conditions. 
Are there manufacturer components available to upgrade the instrument? 
Weight—How much the field instrument, including battery pack, weighs. 
The specifications, such as precision, for each instrument are given in Table A-1; additional 
information, such as cost, is given in Table A-2. 
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Appendix B 
Interview Responses from Incident Commanders 
Incident commanders (IC) from across the United States and one from Canada were interviewed to 
learn their perspectives on instrumentation available for measuring hazardous vapor that might be present. 
The initial questions posed to them related to instrumentation they have available for use in response to a 
potential terrorist incident involving chemical agents released into the air. Questions were asked about the 
incident scene and decision-making process. Finally, questions were asked about maintenance and 
training issues. For each IC, the individual questions are given, followed by the response. 
B-1. CHIEF LUTHER FINCHER,  
CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA, FIRE DEPARTMENT 
Robert C. Gareri and Joseph D. Evans conducted this interview during February 2005. 
B-1.1 Technical Questions on Instrumentation 
1. What vapor detection instruments and tests do you currently use? 
We currently utilize four-gas air monitors, PIDs, colorimetric chips and tubes, weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) test papers, and chemical agent detectors. These include:  
a. Industrial Scientific TMX-412 and ITX meters 
b. Industrial Scientific VX500 PIDs 
c. Biosystems, 4 gas meters 
d. Draeger tubes and chips 
e. M-8 and M-9 Chemical test papers 
f. Rae Systems Multirae 4 gas meters 
g. Rae Systems Minirae PID 
h. Smiths Detection APD 2000 
i. Microsensor Systems SAW minicad. 
2. Do these instruments or tests provide the data you need to make decisions about 
an incident? Name any specific shortcomings of the instruments.  
Yes, they provide a wide array of detection capabilities and provide a starting point for the 
HAZMAT team to advise the IC on a hazard class or category. 
a. We need long-term instrumentation for extended events with remote data transfer for 
standoff capability  
b. Errors in interpretation of readings can occur if a wrong correction factor is utilized  
c. Cross sensitivity of sensors to interference gases can cause problems  
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d. They are expensive to calibrate and maintain; for example, the APD 2000s must be sent 
to the manufacturer each year for calibration and radiological swipe tests 
e. Lifespan of the electro-chemical sensors and PID bulbs 
f. Cost of the simulant and calibration gas 
g. Manufacture need to provide software updates to overcome problems with some 
instruments false positives. 
3. Do they provide more data than needed? Could they be simpler?  
We feel they provide accurate data for their specific intention. Meters could always be made 
simpler. The initial on-scene responders basically need an inexpensive go/no go meter with none 
of the bells and whistles. Our 4-gas meters provide the data based on Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA)/National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) 
standards. Time-weighted average (TWA) and short-term exposure limit (STEL) values are built 
into the 4 gas meters and most of the time this data is not needed by the IC. The newer meters 
allow the “hiding” of these readings for later retrieval if needed. If I could design the perfect 
meter it would be one that would go into alarm if it detected any atmosphere or condition where 
the firefighters bunker gear and air pack did not provide him the level of protection needed to 
keep him safe. 
4. What additional information regarding instrumentation or a test do you want or 
need that you are currently not receiving, e.g., test sensitivity, F (-) or F (+) rate, 
etc.?
It would be helpful to have telemetry from the hot zone that integrates into a real-time Global 
Information System (GIS) model for better determination of where the contamination is and 
where is it going. This telemetry could be tied into existing modeling systems such as 
Consequence Assessment Tool Set (CATS) and Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability 
(HPAC).
5. What actions or procedures are performed or implemented that seem unique to 
your organization for chemical sensing? 
a. We utilize a multitude of capabilities on multiple companies  
b. All HAZMAT units carry multiple instruments from different manufacturers  
c. Each Ladder Company carries a four-gas monitor. Engines are being upgraded to 4-gas 
capability. Radiation detectors have been ordered for all of our apparatus. 
d. A laboratory-working group has been established and procedures are being developed at 
this time to decrease lag time for confirmation by using existing local laboratories. 
6. Are there media (e.g., air, water, soil) for which you do not have instrumentation or 
test kits, or their “performance” is insufficient, or the instrument or test is too 
complex for field use? 
a. For solid and liquid tests we can utilize a Sensor IR. This requires a high degree of 
training and competence to use.  
b. PIDs give an indication that a volatile organic vapor (VOC) is present, but do not identify 
the specific VOC
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c. Performance of the bio test kits shows a tendency to give false positives. 
B-1.2 Incident Scene Questions 
1. What actions do you or your organization take with a positive instrument or test 
finding and likewise with a negative finding? 
a. With a positive reading from the instruments, we isolate the area, have our personnel in 
proper personal protective equipment (PPE) with respiratory protection, determine the 
cause, and ventilate until the area is safe. Also additional meters or test equipment is 
utilized to verify the first meter readings.  
b. With toxic industrial chemicals or VOC, we isolate and determine the specific chemical 
c. We also research specific readings/chemicals for follow up from County Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) and Health Departments. 
2. What follow-up steps are taken to avoid the possibility of a false positive or false 
negative?
We utilize different testing methods, meters, and manufacturers of instruments to confirm 
readings. Verification may be conducted by lab tests if necessary. 
3. Based on initial incident situation reports, how do first responders in your 
organization choose the appropriate level and type of personal protective 
equipment, instruments, and test kits to bring into the field?
Pre-arrival information, incident location, and on-scene evaluations figure into their response to 
incidents. They have the proper PPE up to the level of their training, HAZMAT Ops +. All 
engines and ladders have basic air monitoring capabilities. The HAZMAT team always carries all 
of their testing equipment with them, and they carry equipment to make Level A entries. 
4. Do you have a procedure for when your testing equipment finds nothing, but it is 
obvious there is something amiss e.g., sick or dead individuals?  
We would request assistance from County EPA, County Health, and other appropriate agencies. 
For sick building syndrome, for example, we would advise the responsible party to contract with 
an industrial testing company through County EPA and County Health. The IC, if he has reason 
to believe WMD/Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives (CBRNE), has the 
ability to call additional resources to assist him on scene. These include the ALERT (Advanced 
Local Emergency Response Team), Regional hazardous material (HAZMAT) Teams, PHRST 
(Public Health Regional Surveillance Team), and other state resources. 
B-1.3 Decision Making 
1. Do you participate in a formal or informal network of ICs in communities, states, 
or regions for information exchange regarding instrumentation or test 
performance, reliability, and utility? 
a. Formally, we network through the state regional response teams and the state HAZMAT 
association
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b. Informally, we use word-of-mouth and follow-up on negative reports of instrument or 
equipment failure 
2. Are specifications for detecting chemical agents standard from a national source 
or do you have the prerogative to select instruments or tests according to your 
specifications?
We select instruments according to our needs and funds availability. However, we utilize all 
methods and reports of meter performance and testing that have been done by other agencies. 
3. Do you have performance or data quality information on your instruments? 
Some of our detection equipment has this information available. Most of this data, though, is 
provided by the manufacture themselves. 
4. Who or what process determines if more in-depth agent analysis is needed at an 
incident scene?
The incident commander at a scene would make this decision, with the advice of and in 
consultation with the HAZMAT officers. For a suspected WMD, white powder, CBRNE or other 
suspected act, the FBI would be consulted or analysis turned over to them to run at the designated 
testing lab for our area. 
5. What is the source of more in-depth analysis? Local, State, Federal, or National 
Lab?
State lab. 
6. What data are needed to make the decision to get more in depth analysis? What 
more could an instrument provide? 
Potential biological agents: meters telling you that something is there and you are unable to 
identify what it is. 
B-1.4 Maintenance and Training Questions 
1. Is there a program in place in your organization for replacement of obsolete 
instrumentation or testing kits and equipment to ensure it is not beyond the 
usable shelf life or to ensure that it is properly maintained?  
Yes, we have inventory control. We use docking/calibration stations for centralized data 
collection, maintenance records, tracking of repair, and meter sustainment costs. 
2. Do you have non-toxic challenge agent materials (effective surrogates) and/or 
quantitative standards to evaluate instrument or test performance on a routine 
basis?
We use actual/bottled calibration gas for meters. The other WMD instruments have non-toxic 
challenge/testing materials with them that is used. 
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3. Other than users’ manuals, are there training courses for the operation of 
instruments or conduct of tests in your organization and also user proficiency 
standards, demonstrations or evaluations?
Yes, we have annual HAZMAT training for the firefighters. We utilize quarterly training for the 
HAZMAT Techs. We bring in outside expert and peer level instructors to assist in the training of 
our HAZMAT team. We have training officers who duties include keeping all of our personnel 
current and updated on required training and certifications that the Fire Chief and command staff 
determine that we need. 
4. Do you have the knowledge to provide confidence in choosing instruments or 
tests to have on hand and decide which is appropriate for the situation at hand?  
As a department, the Charlotte Fire Department has access to a broad spectrum of knowledge and 
abilities. The HAZMAT team is highly trained and consists of two separate stations that man four 
pieces of apparatus. As new technologies come to market we constantly strive to evaluate and 
determine if they can assist the team. 
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B-2. CHIEF EDDIE BURNS, JR. 
DALLAS, TEXAS, FIRE DEPARTMENT 
Robert C. Gareri and Joseph D. Evans conducted the original interview with Steve Abraira during 
February 2005. Additional information was submitted by Eddie Burns Jr. in October 2006. 
B-2.1 Technical Questions on Instrumentation 
1. What vapor detection instruments and tests do you currently use? 
a. Colormetric tubes 
b. Photoionization detection 
c. Metal oxide sensors 
d. We use the following brands: RAE, Draeger, AIM, Sensit, Smiths, Ludlum, Alexeter. 
2. Do these instruments or tests provide the data you need to make decisions about 
an incident? Name any specific shortcomings of the instruments.  
Yes.
a. Battery life too short (charging issues) 
b. Requires calibration (gas, costs, training, expiration) 
c. Readout may be confusing or poorly displayed 
d. Costs for repair 
e. Expiration of sensors or test strips. 
3. Do they provide more data than needed? Could they be simpler?  
Data is adequate. Simpler operation is always desirable. 
4. What additional information regarding instrumentation or a test do you want or 
need that you are currently not receiving, e.g., test sensitivity, F (-) or F (+) rate, 
etc.?
No additional information. 
5. What actions or procedures are performed or implemented that seem unique to 
your organization for chemical sensing? 
Unknown.
6. Are there media (e.g., air, water, soil) for which you do not have instrumentation or 
test kits, or their “performance” is insufficient, or the instrument or test is too 
complex for field use?
Not applicable. 
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B-2.2 Incident Scene Questions 
1. What actions do you or your organization take with a positive instrument or test 
finding and likewise with a negative finding? 
A positive test allows us to develop our response plan and site safety plan. It allows us to develop 
our decontamination (DECON) plan and select PPE. A negative test still requires us to perform 
additional testing to attempt to classify the contaminant. 
2. What follow-up steps are taken to avoid the possibility of a false positive or false 
negative?
We will conduct similar tests to attempt to analyze the contaminant. When this fails, we rely to 
lab analysis. 
3. Based on initial incident situation reports, how do first responders in your 
organization choose the appropriate level and type of personal protective 
equipment, instruments, and test kits to bring into the field?
First responders in our department are trained to make observations from afar and call for backup 
from the Hazardous Materials Team. The Team will develop a response plan based on what they 
think the commodity is. Observations include container configurations, material safety data sheets 
(MSDS) information, user information, signs and/or symptoms of contaminated victims, etc. The 
PPE selection is based on information provided from the above. Instruments will be selected on 
what we think the material is or what hazard class we think it is. We always test for radiation, 
lower explosive limit (LEL), pH, WMD in all incidents, unless we have specific commodity 
information. 
4. Do you have a procedure for when your testing equipment finds nothing, but it is 
obvious there is something amiss e.g., sick or dead individuals?  
Of course. You cannot rely solely on instrumentation. We will obtain samples for lab analysis. 
We would attempt to get more information from a user, shipper, or manufacturer of the material. 
When sick or dead individuals are present, in addition to toxic industrial chemicals (TICs), one 
must consider WMDs. 
B-2.3 Decision Making 
1. Do you participate in a formal or informal network of ICs in communities, states, 
or regions for information exchange regarding instrumentation or test 
performance, reliability, and utility? 
It is an informal network. We have an individual in our department who determines which 
instruments require further evaluation from the Hazardous Materials Team. This individual 
attends trade shows, and meets with vendors to keep up on technology. 
2. Are specifications for detecting chemical agents standard from a national source 
or do you have the prerogative to select instruments or tests according to your 
specifications?
We determine which are appropriate based on which instruments will meet our needs. 
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3. Do you have performance or data quality information on your instruments? 
Data quality. 
4. Who or what process determines if more in-depth agent analysis is needed at an 
incident scene?
The HAZMAT IC. 
5. What is the source of more in-depth analysis? Local, State, Federal, or National 
Lab?
Local contract lab—private and public. However, we have sent samples to Federal testing centers. 
6. What data are needed to make the decision to get more in depth analysis? What 
more could an instrument provide? 
I do not think the technology exists for one instrument to perform all required analysis. 
B-2.4 Maintenance and Training Questions 
1. Is there a program in place in your organization for replacement of obsolete 
instrumentation or testing kits and equipment to ensure it is not beyond the 
usable shelf life or to ensure that it is properly maintained?  
Yes. As instruments are sent in for repair, we take the recommendation of the sales or repair 
representative as to either repair or retire the instrument. We have numerous instruments that 
experience circuit board malfunctions. These repairs are costly, thus we will replace the 
instrument.
2. Do you have non-toxic challenge agent materials (effective surrogates) and/or 
quantitative standards to evaluate instrument or test performance on a routine 
basis?
We use specifically calibration gas for test performance. All instruments are calibrated after each 
use and then monthly. 
3. Other than users’ manuals, are there training courses for the operation of 
instruments or conduct of tests in your organization and also user proficiency 
standards, demonstrations, or evaluations?
The HAZMAT team provides all refresher training for instruments dispersed throughout the 
department. Additionally, we have a great factory repair and sales force who stand by all of our 
needs. We host training sessions for outside as well as internal departments. 
4. Do you have the knowledge to provide confidence in choosing instruments or 
tests to have on hand and decide which is appropriate for the situation at hand?  
Yes.
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B-3. CHIEF BILL MACKAY 
FAIRFAX COUNTY BATTALION, INCIDENT COMMANDER 
Dr. Dean Neptune conducted this interview on January 10, 2005, over the telephone with Fairfax 
County Battalion Chief Bill MacKay, Incident Commander for the Hazardous Materials Special 
Operation Team, 703/246-4388. Chief MacKay is due to retire shortly and will take a position with the 
Fairfax County Office of Emergency Management, as a civilian employee, reporting to Mr. Doug Bass, 
703/280-0584 the office head. This Emergency Management Office coordinates the various other county 
offices that may become involved in a hazardous incident. 
B-3.1 Technical Questions on Instrumentation 
1. What vapor detection instruments and tests do you currently use? 
The following instruments are available for use with the Fairfax County Hazardous Materials 
Team for response to air borne release of chemical or biological constituents: Rees PID, Military 
Test Kit Wet Chemistry 256, field deployable Inficon GC/MS, GasTech Monitors for O2, CO, 
HS2, and Combustible Gases, SAM 235 Radionuclide Detector for D, E, J detection, Smiths 
Detection Travel IR (currently only works for solid samples) APD2000 and Surface Acoustical 
Wave Minicad. 
2. Do these instruments or tests provide the data you need to make decisions about 
an incident? Name any specific shortcomings of the instruments.  
False positive findings, instruments designed for laboratory or military use and not first 
responders, instrument sometimes represent yesterday’s technology or unproven technology for 
this specific use, expensive, false negatives have often not been evaluated, significant 
maintenance or calibration requirements, and gas chromatography (GC)/mass spectrometry (MS) 
requires a technician with significant training to operate the instrument. 
3. Do they provide more data than needed? Could they be simpler?  
Sometimes the instrument design attempts to do more than needed by the first responder with 
information such as indicating what protective clothing the responder needs to wear, data logging, 
and specific type of acid when usually only acid is adequate information for most acids. 
4. What additional information regarding instrumentation or a test do you want or 
need that you are currently not receiving, e.g., test sensitivity, F (-) or F (+) rate, 
etc.?
Manufacturers that are not always fully candid regarding instrument capabilities and limitations 
currently use networking amongst colleagues who have purchased the instrument to find out the 
true capabilities of instruments. A truly independent party evaluation of instruments considering 
field performance using conditions established by first responders would be an important step in 
overcoming this deficiency, rather than bench top performance. 
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5. What actions or procedures are performed or implemented that seem unique to 
your organization for chemical sensing? 
Exotic chemical and agents are seen by this IC as not the largest threat, but more likely industrial 
chemicals that are more readily available and useable for a terrorist action, such as chlorine gas or 
even fuels. Metro Washington D.C. is somewhat unique in that no large rail yards, chemical 
plants, or refineries are nearly as often found in other metro areas, so this observation may be 
only correct for Washington. 
6. Are there media (e.g., air, water, soil) for which you do not have instrumentation or 
test kits, or their “performance” is insufficient, or the instrument or test is too 
complex for field use?
Media are currently not well covered by available instrumentation. 
B-3.2 Incident Scene Questions 
1. What actions do you or your organization take with a positive instrument or test 
finding and likewise with a negative finding? 
This is a cause for great concern that something has been missed and typically they look for 
symptoms in exposed individuals or wildlife for additional information. An apparent false 
negative is of greatest concern especially if exposed individuals do not immediately present 
symptoms. For biological agents, samples are sent for further confirmation if the situation 
warrants.
2. What follow-up steps are taken to avoid the possibility of a false positive or false 
negative?
Letters are provided to the potentially exposed individuals indicating the types of symptoms they 
should look for over the ensuing several days or weeks and who to call if they are presented. This 
approach, however, does lead to high rates of pseudo-symptomatic calls from these individuals. 
3. Based on initial incident situation reports, how do first responders in your 
organization choose the appropriate level and type of personal protective 
equipment, instruments, and test kits to bring into the field?
Protocol is established for all responses and staff is certified according to this protocol, i.e., hope 
for the best, assume the worst. 
4. Do you have a procedure for when your testing equipment finds nothing, but it is 
obvious there is something amiss e.g., sick or dead individuals?  
See above response to Question 2 in this section. Typically this IC would not leave the scene 
under these circumstances and may often call in additional expertise to help sort out the concern 
that something is potentially being missed. No formal protocol other than a common sense 
approach.
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B-3.3 Decision Making 
1. Do you participate in a formal or informal network of ICs in communities, states, 
or regions for information exchange regarding instrumentation or test 
performance, reliability, and utility? 
Washington Council of Governments (COG) meets monthly where information exchanges often 
occur. Also attend the Fire Department Institute conference where similar exchanges occur. 
Worth noting is Chief MacKay observation that many courses, for fee from private concerns, are 
being offered these days that could also be had without fee from various governmental 
institutions.
2. Are specifications for detecting chemical warfare agents standard from a national 
source or do you have the prerogative to select instruments or tests according to 
your specifications? 
Typically, Fairfax Country defines a need (informal specifications) and then looks for potential 
sources to fill the need. There are a few formal specifications like Underwriters Laboratories, Inc. 
(UL) approved and the like. 
3. Do you have performance or data quality information on your instruments? 
Typically ask the instrument manufacturer for performance specifications. Of greatest concern is 
rate of false positive and negative findings, instrument sensitivity, and potential for interferences 
from other chemical constituents. 
4. Who or what process determines if more in-depth agent analysis is needed at an 
incident scene?
See above comments on related questions. Usually if more laboratory support is deemed 
necessary the Fairfax County Health Department is now engaged and if criminal concerns are an 
element of the decision than the FBI is engaged. Samples are handled as evidence for court today, 
i.e., chain of custody. 
5. What is the source of more in-depth analysis? Local, State, Federal, or National 
Lab?
If more laboratory support is determined necessary then these samples are sent to the Laboratory 
Response Network (LRN) in Richmond, VA and there the determination is made if further,  
more-specialized laboratory support is necessary. At this point the Fairfax County Health 
Department and perhaps other departments are engaged as well as the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI). 
6. What data are needed to make the decision to get more in depth analysis? What 
more could an instrument provide? 
If a biological sample culture is needed and if individuals are expressing symptoms, but no 
chemical constituent(s) are observed then samples are sent for further analyses. 
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B-3.4 Maintenance and Training Questions 
1. Is there a program in place in your organization for replacement of obsolete 
instrumentation or testing kits and equipment to ensure it is not beyond the 
usable shelf life or to ensure that it is properly maintained?  
Instruments as they are obsolete or cannot be repaired and consumable test replaced in advance of 
their shelf life expiration. Need to decontaminate instruments has not arisen to date. 
2. Do you have non-toxic challenge agent materials (effective surrogates) and/or 
quantitative standards to evaluate instrument or test performance on a routine 
basis?
Yes, for the APD 2000 and do have some knows but do not have challenge materials for every 
instrument or test. 
3. Other than users’ manuals, are there training courses for the operation of 
instruments or conduct of tests in your organization and also user proficiency 
standards, demonstrations, or evaluations?
Fairfax County is instituting proficiency standards in the near future. Training now is typically 
limited to that initially provided by the instrument manufacturer and on the job training of staff. 
4. Do you have the knowledge to provide confidence in choosing instruments or 
tests to have on hand and decide which is appropriate for the situation at hand?  
Chief MacKay indicated that the county has purchased what he referred to as “white elephants” 
and they would greatly benefit from a “Consumers Report” type source of information that was 
generated to meet the specific needs of first responders as the using audience. 
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B-4. CAPTAIN JOHN LUND 
IDAHO FALLS, IDAHO, FIRE DEPARTMENT AND REGIONAL 
HAZMAT RESPONSE TEAM 
Matthew G. Watrous conducted this interview in January 2005 in person with Captain John Lund, 
Regional HAZMAT Response Team Captain, 208-529-1211. 
B-4.1 Technical Questions on Instrumentation 
1. What vapor detection instruments and tests do you currently use? 
The HAZMAT teams carry the 4-gas meter, colorimetric tubes, photoionization detectors (PID), 
gas infrared instrument, liquid/solid infrared instrument, Haz Cat kit, and ion mobility 
spectrometer (APD 2000), radiation monitors, and a RAMP system for bio threats. 
2. Do these instruments or tests provide the data you need to make decisions about 
an incident? Name any specific shortcomings of the instruments.  
Yes.
Likes his equipment, but would like to know what else is out there, he does not have time to find 
other information. 
3. Do they provide more data than needed? Could they be simpler?  
Do not provide more than needed.  
4. What additional information regarding instrumentation or a test do you want or 
need that you are currently not receiving, e.g., test sensitivity, F (-) or F (+) rate, 
etc.?
No knowledge about competing products. 
5. What actions or procedures are performed or implemented that seem unique to 
your organization for chemical sensing? 
Perform similarly to all Idaho teams. 
6. Are there media (e.g., air, water, soil) for which you do not have instrumentation or 
test kits, or their “performance” is insufficient, or the instrument or test is too 
complex for field use?
Not applicable. 
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B-4.2 Incident Scene Questions 
1. What actions do you or your organization take with a positive instrument or test 
finding and likewise with a negative finding? 
First priority is always getting people out of harm’s way. Incident commander makes decisions 
based on all information available. If positive, evacuate if appropriate. If negative, look at other 
information. If people are showing symptoms, evacuate anyway. 
2. What follow-up steps are taken to avoid the possibility of a false positive or false 
negative?
Bridge calls with state level or calling in additional help after location is cleared of people. 
3. Based on initial incident situation reports, how do first responders in your 
organization choose the appropriate level and type of personal protective 
equipment, instruments, and test kits to bring into the field?
From standards—State level, NFPA 472 has some HAZMAT, OSHA 1910.120, EPA has some 
influence.
4. Do you have a procedure for when your testing equipment finds nothing, but it is 
obvious there is something amiss e.g., sick or dead individuals?  
Civil support team can respond with mobile laboratory. 
B-4.3 Decision Making 
1. Do you participate in a formal or informal network of ICs in communities, states, 
or regions for information exchange regarding instrumentation or test 
performance, reliability, and utility? 
Rely on a person at the state level for selecting instruments. He uses the Selected Equipment Lists 
and Approved Equipment Lists. 
2. Are specifications for detecting chemical agents standard from a national source 
or do you have the prerogative to select instruments or tests according to your 
specifications?
Rely on a person at the state level for selecting and purchasing instruments. He uses the Selected 
Equipment Lists and Approved Equipment Lists. 
3. Do you have performance or data quality information on your instruments? 
Rely on a person at the state level for selecting and purchasing instruments. He uses the Selected 
Equipment Lists and Approved Equipment Lists. 
4. Who or what process determines if more in-depth agent analysis is needed at an 
incident scene?
Incident Commander. 
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5. What is the source of more in-depth analysis? Local, State, Federal, or National 
Lab?
101st Civil Support Team has a mobile lab. State lab is available as fixed facility. 
6. What data are needed to make the decision to get more in depth analysis? What 
more could an instrument provide? 
Not applicable. 
B-4.4 Maintenance and Training Questions 
1. Is there a program in place in your organization for replacement of obsolete 
instrumentation or testing kits and equipment to ensure it is not beyond the 
usable shelf life or to ensure that it is properly maintained?  
Tied to the State budget.
2. Do you have non-toxic challenge agent materials (effective surrogates) and/or 
quantitative standards to evaluate instrument or test performance on a routine 
basis?
Had a guy that did calibrations, but retired and no one to fill role. 
3. Other than users’ manuals, are there training courses for the operation of 
instruments or conduct of tests in your organization and also user proficiency 
standards, demonstrations, or evaluations?
Training occurs at time of purchase by vendor. On the job training by fellow team members after 
initial training. 
4. Do you have the knowledge to provide confidence in choosing instruments or 
tests to have on hand and decide which is appropriate for the situation at hand?  
Rely on a person at the state level for selecting and purchasing instruments. He uses the Selected 
Equipment Lists and Approved Equipment Lists. He solicits input from the field. The decision 
maker in the field does not feel he has enough knowledge or information to help in this area, but 
the state level decision maker is confident in his abilities to supply his guys with the right 
equipment. 
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B-5. DEPUTY CHIEF MICHAEL BRYANT 
LOS ANGELES COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, FIRE DEPARTMENT 
Robert C. Gareri and Joseph D. Evans conducted this interview during February 2005. 
B-5.1 Technical Questions on Instrumentation 
1. What vapor detection instruments and tests do you currently use? 
Multi-gas meters, colorimetric tubes, and gas specific instruments. 
2. Do these instruments or tests provide the data you need to make decisions about 
an incident? Name any specific shortcomings of the instruments.  
Yes.
Multi-gas meters yield little specific information on toxicity; training can be intensive and some 
meters are expensive. 
3. Do they provide more data than needed?  
Not necessarily. If anything, less than desired. 
Could they be simpler? 
No. We desire qualitative and quantitative information. Some units are too simple, rendering 
suspicion in its results. 
4. What additional information regarding instrumentation or a test do you want or 
need that you are currently not receiving, e.g., test sensitivity, F (-) or F (+) rate, 
etc.?
No comment. 
5. What actions or procedures are performed or implemented that seem unique to 
your organization for chemical sensing? 
None.
6. Are there media (e.g., air, water, soil) for which you do not have instrumentation or 
test kits, or their “performance” is insufficient, or the instrument or test is too 
complex for field use?
No.
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B-5.2 Incident Scene Questions 
1. What actions do you or your organization take with a positive instrument or test 
finding and likewise with a negative finding? 
(Positive finding): Responder protection, including turn-back and re-grouping as necessary, 
accelerated life-saving response (rapid extraction) and consideration of DECON. (Negative 
finding): Verification of findings by alternate methods. 
2. What follow-up steps are taken to avoid the possibility of a false positive or false 
negative?
Use of alternative methods of detection. 
3. Based on initial incident situation reports, how do first responders in your 
organization choose the appropriate level and type of personal protective 
equipment, instruments, and test kits to bring into the field?
They follow protocols learned from First Responder Operational (FRO) training in hazardous 
materials response and terrorism consequence management. 
4. Do you have a procedure for when your testing equipment finds nothing, but it is 
obvious there is something amiss e.g., sick or dead individuals?  
Decontamination and triage, treatment, and transportation for the sick. The dead are re-examined 
for more evidence prior to removal from the scene. 
B-5.3 Decision Making 
1. Do you participate in a formal or informal network of ICs in communities, states, 
or regions for information exchange regarding instrumentation or test 
performance, reliability, and utility? 
This department relies on special operations units to do this. It is both formal and informal. 
2. Are specifications for detecting chemical warfare agents standard from a national 
source or do you have the prerogative to select instruments or tests according to 
your specifications? 
National.
3. Do you have performance or data quality information on your instruments? 
Some, not all. 
4. Who or what process determines if more in-depth agent analysis is needed at an 
incident scene?
Local health department official or law enforcement decision based on protocols created by fire, 
health, and law representation. 
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5. What is the source of more in-depth analysis? Local, State, Federal, or National 
Lab?
Local, unless otherwise directed. 
6. What data are needed to make the decision to get more in depth analysis? What 
more could an instrument provide? 
Circumstances (i.e., injuries), facilities where the incident occurred (e.g., Federal), and the need 
to have a more controlled environment that labs provide that field detection cannot provide. 
B-5.4 Maintenance and Training Questions 
1. Is there a program in place in your organization for replacement of obsolete 
instrumentation or testing kits and equipment to ensure it is not beyond the 
usable shelf life or to ensure that it is properly maintained?  
Yes, adherence to manufacturer’s recommendations, recommendations from independent 
calibration personnel, and periodic review of instrumentation effectiveness. 
2. Do you have non-toxic challenge agent materials (effective surrogates) and/or 
quantitative standards to evaluate instrument or test performance on a routine 
basis?
Some, not all. 
3. Other than users’ manuals, are there training courses for the operation of 
instruments or conduct of tests in your organization and also user proficiency 
standards, demonstrations, or evaluations?
Some, not all. It is nevertheless desired to have more than a user manual. Proficiency is based on 
the minimum standards as provided by agencies such as National Fire Protection Agency 
(NFPA), California Code of Regulations (CCR), Title 19, CFR 11910.120q, et al. 
4. Do you have the knowledge to provide confidence in choosing instruments or 
tests to have on hand and decide which is appropriate for the situation at hand?  
FRO personnel rely on Special Operations personnel and local health department authorities to 
provide guidance. 
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B-6. CHIEF DAVE A. PASQUALE 
RATON, NEW MEXICO, FIRE AND EMERGENCY SERVICES 
On January 28, 2005, Mr. Daniel Michael discussed the survey with Chief David Pasquale, Raton, 
New Mexico (505-445-2708). Chief Pasquale is in charge of both the Raton Fire and Emergency Services 
and the New Mexico Regional Hazardous Materials Response Team and is, therefore, very familiar with 
instrumentation for first responders. In preparation for further discussions, Mr. Michael sent the list of 
questions to Chief Pasquale who provided in depth responses in writing on February 2, 2005. 
B-6.1 Technical Questions on Instrumentation 
1. What vapor detection instruments and tests do you currently use? 
We use the standard vapor test equipment that most HAZMAT teams use: combustible gas 
detectors with sensors for O2, LEL, CO and 1 additional gas. We also use colorimetric tubes for 
qualitative and quantitative results. Our team also deploys areaRAES which are four gas + PID 
for entry. These units have built in transmitters which allow command to see all conditions in the 
hot zone. In addition to the standard technology, we also employ the Sabre 2000 which uses Ion 
Mobility Spectrometry (IMS) technology. This instrument is capable of detecting chemical 
weapons, drugs, and explosives. The AP2C is used for chemical weapon detection. We also have 
on order the GAS ID. This device uses infrared spectroscopy to analyze samples and identify the 
vapor.
2. Do these instruments or tests provide the data you need to make decisions about 
an incident? Name any specific shortcomings of the instruments.  
Most of the instruments provide enough information.
Most short comings would be battery life and calibration issues. 
3. Do they provide more data than needed? Could they be simpler?  
Depending on the instrument some provide too much information for the operator. In most cases 
the information is needed by command. 
4. What additional information regarding instrumentation or a test do you want or 
need that you are currently not receiving, e.g., test sensitivity, F (-) or F (+) rate, 
etc.?
We are happy with the equipment and information. 
5. What actions or procedures are performed or implemented that seem unique to 
your organization for chemical sensing? 
I think our procedures are more at the level of operation that you would see with the CSTs. We 
have tried to adopt as much of their procedures as possible to allow for a seamless transfer of 
operations or joint missions. 
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6. Are there media (e.g., air, water, soil) for which you do not have instrumentation or 
test kits, or their “performance” is insufficient, or the instrument or test is too 
complex for field use?
It depends on the testing to be done. We routinely test soil for hydrocarbon levels using the PIDs. 
Water can be tested for pH, etc. Specific tests are available but not routinely carried by HAZMAT 
teams.
B-6.2 Incident Scene Questions 
1. What actions do you or your organization take with a positive instrument or test 
finding and likewise with a negative finding? 
It depends on the call and the suspected material. We work with State Environmental Department 
and handle most spills without outside help. If it is related to Homeland Security, we work with 
other agencies such as the postal inspectors in order to share all results and info. If needed we will 
suggest further testing by labs. 
2. What follow-up steps are taken to avoid the possibility of a false positive or false 
negative?
If it is a credible threat, we will advise further testing. We are very confident though in our 
equipment and we are willing to base most decisions on our test results. 
3. Based on initial incident situation reports, how do first responders in your 
organization choose the appropriate level and type of personal protective 
equipment, instruments, and test kits to bring into the field?
All personnel are trained to the technician level. By the use of standard operating procedures 
(SOPs) personnel have the knowledge to select the appropriate gear. 
4. Do you have a procedure for when your testing equipment finds nothing, but it is 
obvious there is something amiss e.g., sick or dead individuals?  
We have never had that situation. If we did, we would request outside assistance, probably the 
New Mexico Civil Support Team. 
B-6.3 Decision Making 
1. Do you participate in a formal or informal network of ICs in communities, states, 
or regions for information exchange regarding instrumentation or test 
performance, reliability, and utility? 
We do network with other ICs but nothing formal. 
2. Are specifications for detecting chemical agents standard from a national source 
or do you have the prerogative to select instruments or tests according to your 
specifications?
You have the ability to select based on your knowledge and the level of expertise of your 
personnel. There should be a minimum standard, possibly from Homeland Security for all levels 
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of response teams, from first responders to technician level teams. This should include simple 
detection devices such as M8-M9 paper for all first responders to high end detection for teams. 
3. Do you have performance or data quality information on your instruments? 
Most detection devices make that information known to the end users, mainly for liability issues. 
4. Who or what process determines if more in-depth agent analysis is needed at an 
incident scene?
The incident commander on the advice of the HAZMAT officer. 
5. What is the source of more in-depth analysis? Local, State, Federal, or National 
Lab?
Good question. The answer should be a network of approved labs all accessible to ICs. The truth, 
nobody knows. We have experienced this first hand. Even State agencies have no clue! 
6. What data are needed to make the decision to get more in depth analysis? What 
more could an instrument provide? 
I am sure some day in the future additional testing will not be needed. Right now the field 
personnel would need at least two qualitative tests with negative results. Depending on the 
material 2 types of tests may not be available. For example, with our Sensir IR we can identify 
the presence of a biological. When we go to test with an assay strip we may not have the required 
spore count to test positive. That would require the assistance of a lab. 
B-6.4 Maintenance and Training Questions 
1. Is there a program in place in your organization for replacement of obsolete 
instrumentation or testing kits and equipment to ensure it is not beyond the 
usable shelf life or to ensure that it is properly maintained?  
There are weekly, monthly, quarterly and annual maintenance, testing and calibration for all 
instruments including rad. We are always looking for new equipment and adding that to our 
arsenal.
2. Do you have non-toxic challenge agent materials (effective surrogates) and/or 
quantitative standards to evaluate instrument or test performance on a routine 
basis?
Yes, we do have some test materials supplied by the manufacturers. 
3. Other than users’ manuals, are there training courses for the operation of 
instruments or conduct of tests in your organization and also user proficiency 
standards, demonstrations, or evaluations?
All personnel must have a minimum of 40 hours per year of continuing education credits. In all 
reality most end up with much more. When new equipment is purchased we either have the 
manufacturer supply the preliminary training or we do it in house. Also, personnel attend a 
minimum of two exercises per year. 
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4. Do you have the knowledge to provide confidence in choosing instruments or 
tests to have on hand and decide which is appropriate for the situation at hand?  
I feel confident that we have assembled one of the best assortments of test equipment for any 
team in the Southwest. We have also supplied first responders in the County with basic test 
equipment that will assist them in making the appropriate decisions. We encourage all responders 
that when in doubt, call us. 
In addition we have policies on unknown responses. In this case, a full array of detectors is used, 
including rad, O2, CGI, PID, and CO. 
In regard to Homeland Security, I feel strongly there is a need for standardization nationwide. If 
you look back to the days of civil defense, kits were distributed around the nation, which 
contained 3 radiation detection devices and dosimeters. New York, Florida, Texas, everyone had 
the same equipment. For basic responders, fire, Emergency Management System (EMS), and law 
enforcement the same could be done for WMD. Simple solutions such as “smart paper,” M8, M9, 
etc. could be used. These types of devices along with awareness and operations level training 
would provide the first line of defense. The second need is to standardize the equipment used by 
technician level teams. From APRs to detection equipment we must standardize to provide the 
availability of a national response. We have tried to do this so our technicians can interface with 
the New Mexico Center for Specialized Training (NMCST) and share equipment and resources. 
This should be done coast to coast. 
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B-7. CHIEF JEFF BOWMAN 
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA, FIRE DEPARTMENT 
Robert C. Gareri and Joseph D. Evans conducted this interview during February 2005. 
B-7.1 Technical Questions on Instrumentation 
1. What vapor detection instruments and tests do you currently use? 
Combustible Gas Indicators—Gastech 402/ 201 and Innova for LEL, oxygen, hydrogen sulfide, 
and carbon monoxide. 
Draeger Tubes and Sensidyne Tubes for specific gasses 
Draeger CMS Chips for various specific gases 
Photo Ionization Detector—Multi Rae and Mini Rae for unknown vapors 
JCAD—Surface Acoustic Wave 
APD 2000—Ion Drift for irritants and nerve agents. 
2. Do these instruments or tests provide the data you need to make decisions about 
an incident? Name any specific shortcomings of the instruments.  
Yes, if the gases are detected the instruments give us the information that is needed to make a 
safe and prudent decision. 
Limited substantive analysis, false positives, expensive to purchase, maintain, repair, and 
calibrate. The PID instruments have a limitation in that if the vapor/gas is above the ionization 
potential of the bulb in the instruments, then they will not be detected. If a material that can be 
detected by the instrument is detected, it will let you know that something is there, but not 
necessarily what. Further analysis must be considered. 
3. Do they provide more data than needed? Could they be simpler?  
No. Most of the instruments listed provide enough information to make a cautious decision. The 
Draeger and Sensidyne tubes will give you a qualitative reading of the vapor present in a given 
location if sampling done according to direction. We are more interested in the presence of a 
specific vapor/chemical rather than a qualitative analysis, other factors need to be considered for 
that (e.g., Air flow, source of the leaks, etc.). Could they be simpler? These instruments are 
relatively easy to use for the level of technology they provide. Most of the instruments that we are 
using are relatively easy to operate and read by a simple color change or a preset alarm. 
4. What additional information regarding instrumentation or a test do you want or 
need that you are currently not receiving, e.g., test sensitivity, F (-) or F (+) rate, 
etc.?
We need a radiological monitor that identifies the isotopes it detects. APD gives many false 
positives. Radiation pagers would be more useful if they provided direct reading. It would be nice 
to have a simplified organic vapor analyzer that would specifically identify an unknown with a 
known footprint. 
B-26
5. What actions or procedures are performed or implemented that seem unique to 
your organization for chemical sensing? 
Hazard categorization (Haz Cat) via field chemistry testing kit for powders and chemicals. The 
Mesosystems air sampler for use with bioassay tickets. These tests and procedures are not unique, 
but are relatively new for us. We use tried and true technology to help us make educated 
decisions about chemical sensing, using various instrumentation to detect. 
6. Are there media (e.g., air, water, soil) for which you do not have instrumentation or 
test kits, or their “performance” is insufficient, or the instrument or test is too 
complex for field use?
The Draeger tubes are too complicated to use in Level A PPE. 
B-7.2 Incident Scene Questions 
1. What actions do you or your organization take with a positive instrument or test 
finding and likewise with a negative finding? 
This question is very general. If protective measures are needed prior to mitigation of a leak or 
spill, then those become a priority. Prior to entering into a potentially hazardous environment, as 
much information about the incident is obtained so that proper PPE can be determined. We 
always don the proper level of PPE and follow guidelines with a suspected chemical prior to 
identification. Full Incident Command System setup, backup team in place, DECON in place, site 
safety and action plan prepared, etc. With a positive finding we follow Standard Operating 
Guidelines (SOGs) to mitigate the incident, with a negative finding we employ redundant tests to 
confirm.  
2. What follow-up steps are taken to avoid the possibility of a false positive or false 
negative?
We employ the use of different tests and monitors to confirm finding (never rely on one test). 
Retest to confirm. We also work very closely with and utilize the expertise of our Local 
Department of Environmental Health HAZMAT personnel to confirm our findings. Performing 
some investigative work with a site representative is also very useful in determining the cause for 
a positive reading. Multiple instrumentation sampling may prove out a false positive. If there are 
no signs and symptoms, a false negative is hard to eliminate. 
3. Based on initial incident situation reports, how do first responders in your 
organization choose the appropriate level and type of personal protective 
equipment, instruments, and test kits to bring into the field?
We access several sources of chemical information prior to entering the scene. Much of this 
research is performed en route to the scene using the initial response information. Reference 
sources include TOMES software, MSDSs, ERG book, Condensed Chemical Dictionary, etc. We 
usually take an array of instruments (pH and radiation first) to try and identify. We also sample 
unknown and perform Haz Cat test to determine hazard class. With an unknown chemical we 
default to the highest level of respiratory with splash PPE (Level B), unless incident factors lead 
to a risk analysis that indicate full vapor protection (Level A). 
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4. Do you have a procedure for when your testing equipment finds nothing, but it is 
obvious there is something amiss e.g., sick or dead individuals?  
After taking all steps as outlined in number one above, we would gather as much information 
from the scene, other emergency response agencies, the diagnostic input from medical personnel 
regarding the exposed patients, and the occupants, rely on team and peer experience and 
expertise, and make the best decision possible on the given situation.  
B-7.3 Decision Making 
1. Do you participate in a formal or informal network of ICs in communities, states or 
regions for information exchange regarding instrumentation or test performance, 
reliability, and utility? 
Informal information exchange take place at training courses (California Specialized Training 
Institute [CSTI]) when HAZMAT team members statewide spend time together learning and 
sharing. Another excellent site for networking in California is the Annual Continuing Challenge 
Conference in Sacramento. HAZMAT Teams send members from all over the Country. 
Information is exchanged, opinions on instruments are shared, and vendors display a wide range 
of instruments, which allows attendees to handle equipment, ask questions, and determine if 
instrument meets current needs. Some local and regional groups also meet and exchange 
information. Our Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC) and County Fire Chiefs 
HAZMAT Section are examples. 
2. Are specifications for detecting chemical agents standard from a national source 
or do you have the prerogative to select instruments or tests according to your 
specifications?
Much of the chemical detection equipment that we have received over the past few years are 
items that are approved for purchase through Federal Grants for Terrorism preparedness. We as 
locals do not have input on the specifications. But we do get to select from the list of approved 
equipment and the specifications and tests they have are useful. 
3. Do you have performance or data quality information on your instruments? 
Yes, this information is provided for the instruments we have. 
4. Who or what process determines if more in-depth agent analysis is needed at an 
incident scene?
The circumstances of the incident. Injuries, fatalities, environmental damage, public health risk, 
crime scene, credible threat, all these factors are considered. The Fire Department, Health 
Department, Law enforcement, or combination of any of these agencies might make the decision. 
5. What is the source of more in-depth analysis? Local, State, Federal, or National 
Lab?
Our local Public Health Lab, the Center for Disease Control (CDC) in Atlanta. 
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6. What data are needed to make the decision to get more in depth analysis? What 
more could an instrument provide? 
The circumstances of the incident. Injuries, fatalities, environmental damage, public health risk, 
crime scene, credible threat, all these factors are considered. The Fire Department, Health 
Department, Law enforcement, or combination of any of these agencies might make the decision. 
What more could an instrument provide? Ease of use in field with more in depth results. The 
ability to specifically identify unknowns quickly and accurately in the field. 
B-7.4 Maintenance and Training Questions 
1. Is there a program in place in your organization for replacement of obsolete 
instrumentation or testing kits and equipment to ensure it is not beyond the 
usable shelf life or to ensure that it is properly maintained?  
Somewhat. The equipment, its ongoing maintenance, repair and calibrations are all very 
expensive. Our HAZMAT Team does an excellent job of caring for the equipment they have, this 
allows for a long service life from individual instruments. A replacement schedule is in place, but 
the operating budget sometimes forces maintenance, calibration, repair, and replacement needs to 
be deferred. Some useful instrumentation and testing technology is available, but beyond our 
ability to purchase. 
2. Do you have non-toxic challenge agent materials (effective surrogates) and/or 
quantitative standards to evaluate instrument or test performance on a routine 
basis?
Limited availability on some instruments. Surrogates not routinely purchased. Calibration gasses 
routinely utilized. Improvised surrogates used in house to a small degree. 
3. Other than users’ manuals, are there training courses for the operation of 
instruments or conduct of tests in your organization and also user proficiency 
standards, demonstrations, or evaluations?
In house training aids developed for equipment. Regularly scheduled training sessions for team 
members to practice with equipment. Domestic Preparedness Equipment Technical Assistance 
group has provided several training sessions to our team over past few years. CSTI, and 
Continuing Challenge provide training opportunities for equipment. Vendors will sometimes 
provide training to department members when equipment is purchased. 
4. Do you have the knowledge to provide confidence in choosing instruments or 
tests to have on hand and decide which is appropriate for the situation at hand?  
Yes. Our team is very good at testing and trying out new equipment as it comes available for 
purchase. We have acquired a diverse cache of instruments and tests which we are confident 
provide us with the tools to evaluate and handle situations as they come up. This ability has 
evolved over the years as a result of extensive field experience in responding to hazardous 
materials incidents, coupled with relevant education and training. 
B-29
B-8. LIEUTENANT JOHN DONNELLY 
WASHINGTON, D.C. FIRE DEPARTMENT 
Dr. Keith Daum conducted this interview on March 16, 2005 over the telephone with Washington 
D.C. Fire Chief John Donnelly (202-345-6850). Mr. Donnelly is responsible for hazardous 
incidents in all of the Washington D.C. area. 
B-8.1 Technical Questions on Instrumentation 
1. What vapor detection instruments and tests do you currently use? 
We currently use the following detectors:  
a. MSA Sirius 
b. AIM 604 Four gas 
c. Scott SA-2000 Four gas 
d. ATD 2000 
e. CAMS
f. Drägger tubes and chips 
g. pH paper 
h. Hapsite GC/MS 
i. Rae Systems Multirae 4 gas meters 
j. MSA Safe Site 
k. AP2C
l. Sensit Hxg3. 
2. Do these instruments or tests provide the data you need to make decisions about 
an incident? Name any specific shortcomings of the instruments.  
Instruments are part of an overall strategy. Each provides useful information.  
Other than the Hapsite and the single gas meters, nothing takes a sample and conclusively tells us 
what we have. 
3. Do they provide more data than needed? Could they be simpler?  
At this location, every incident is treated as if it is a potential chemical agent attack. In these 
cases, you want as much data as possible. Instruments could always be made simpler.  
4. What additional information regarding instrumentation or a test do you want or 
need that you are currently not receiving, e.g., test sensitivity, F (-) or F (+) rate, 
etc.?
Some detectors have huge false positive problems (e.g., FIS, SAW, PID). False positives in 
preliminary analyses are identified and corrected during subsequent analyses with more specific 
instruments. False negatives in preliminary analyses can be effectively controlled by using 
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several instruments with different properties to analyze the same sample. A more complete 
database for GC analysis of unknowns would be useful. 
5. What actions or procedures are performed or implemented that seem unique to 
your organization for chemical sensing? 
Because of the location, every incident is treated as if it is a potential chemical agent attack. 
6. Are there media (e.g., air, water, soil) for which you do not have instrumentation or 
test kits, or their “performance” is insufficient, or the instrument or test is too 
complex for field use?
None.
B-8.2 Incident Scene Questions 
1. What actions do you or your organization take with a positive instrument or test 
finding and likewise with a negative finding? 
The question seems to imply a single meter with a positive reading. In that case we would look at 
the other meters for clarification. We would also look to the scenario for cues and if necessary 
collect a sample and send to an FBI lab. 
2. What follow-up steps are taken to avoid the possibility of a false positive or false 
negative?
False negatives in preliminary analyses can be effectively controlled by using several instruments 
with different properties to analyze the same sample. False positives in preliminary analyses are 
identified during subsequent analyses with more specific instruments. A more complete database 
for GC analysis of unknowns would be useful. 
3. Based on initial incident situation reports, how do first responders in your 
organization choose the appropriate level and type of personal protective 
equipment, instruments, and test kits to bring into the field?
Initially, information provided by preliminary instruments is used determine the level of personal 
protective equipment to wear. In cases where a first responder’s life might be in danger, the 
responder is limited to staying the time of one bottle of breathing air. We have a policy that 
allows first responders to make rescues and recon in fire fighter protective clothing, but 
incorporates DECON policies and no go situations. 
4. Do you have a procedure for when your testing equipment finds nothing, but it is 
obvious there is something amiss e.g., sick or dead individuals?  
Prior to metering our first responders are trained to react to signs and symptoms. Actions taken 
would follow a scripted set of remedial actions centered on evacuation and decontamination. 
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B-8.3 Decision Making 
1. Do you participate in a formal or informal network of ICs in communities, states, 
or regions for information exchange regarding instrumentation or test 
performance, reliability, and utility? 
This group is part of the Metropolitan Washington Council of Government (COG) Fire Chief’s 
HAZMAT subcommittee. We are also part of the Regional COG. 
2. Are specifications for detecting chemical agents standard from a national source 
or do you have the prerogative to select instruments or tests according to your 
specifications?
We usually have the option of having an instrument on loan before making a purchase decision. 
We use information from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Certified Equipment List 
and from Edgewood Lab at Aberdeen Proving Grounds. We also fund development of specific 
equipment directly. 
3. Do you have performance or data quality information on your instruments? 
Most of the manufacturers of our detection equipment provide this information. We conduct our 
own tests to confirm. 
4. Who or what process determines if more in-depth agent analysis is needed at an 
incident scene?
At the scene, the incident commander makes this decision. He seeks information as needed. 
5. What is the source of more in-depth analysis? Local, State, Federal, or National 
Lab?
Additional confirmation comes from the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) or other sources as 
needed.
6. What data are needed to make the decision to get more in depth analysis? What 
more could an instrument provide? 
This is made by the Incident Commander. 
B-8.4 Maintenance and Training Questions 
1. Is there a program in place in your organization for replacement of obsolete 
instrumentation or testing kits and equipment to ensure it is not beyond the 
usable shelf life or to ensure that it is properly maintained?  
Yes, we have a program to monitor and replace instruments as needed. 
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2. Do you have non-toxic challenge agent materials (effective surrogates) and/or 
quantitative standards to evaluate instrument or test performance on a routine 
basis?
We usually use manufacturer provided standards and training agents. 
3. Other than users’ manuals, are there training courses for the operation of 
instruments or conduct of tests in your organization and also user proficiency 
standards, demonstrations, or evaluations?
Yes, we send personnel to manufacturer training programs and also have our own in-house 
training program. We have a contract with the Office of Domestic Preparedness in Alabama to 
conduct courses. 
4. Do you have the knowledge to provide confidence in choosing instruments or 
tests to have on hand and decide which is appropriate for the situation at hand?  
Yes, our staff can make these choices. 
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B-9. DEPUTY CHIEF W. H. (WES) SHOEMAKER, 
DEPUTY KEN SIM 
WINNIPEG, CANADA, FIRE PARAMEDIC SERVICE 
Robert C. Gareri and Joseph D. Evans conducted this interview during February 2005. 
B-9.1 Technical Questions on Instrumentation 
1. What vapor detection instruments and tests do you currently use? 
Industrial Scientific and MSA gas analyzers. 
2. Do these instruments or tests provide the data you need to make decisions about 
an incident? Name any specific shortcomings of the instruments.  
These devices provide general information regarding hydrocarbon levels at an incident scene. 
They are unable to tell the IC exactly the hydrocarbon product and the precise concentration 
levels of the product. The IC relies upon other agencies with the expertise onsite to provide more 
detailed analyses. We do not have any devices to determine the presence of biological or 
radiological substances. 
3. Do they provide more data than needed? Could they be simpler?  
No and no. 
4. What additional information regarding instrumentation or a test do you want or 
need that you are currently not receiving, e.g., test sensitivity, F (-) or F (+) rate, 
etc.?
Not sure other than more precision in the concentrations of the products themselves and the 
ability to detect other agents/substances. 
5. What actions or procedures are performed or implemented that seem unique to 
your organization for chemical sensing? 
Basic/Simple/General analysis is done by our service and followed up by more detailed analyses 
by agencies with greater expertise (e.g., we partner with the Provincial Department of 
Environment to do sampling of certain materials). 
6. Are there media (e.g., air, water, soil) for which you do not have instrumentation or 
test kits, or their “performance” is insufficient, or the instrument or test is too 
complex for field use?
We are unable to perform and detailed water analyses; no ability to field test for the presence of 
biological agents (anthrax) or other substances (sarin gas, etc.) without the assistance of other 
agencies.
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B-9.2 Incident Scene Questions 
1. What actions do you or your organization take with a positive instrument or test 
finding and likewise with a negative finding? 
With a positive finding, we obviously take the necessary actions to control and secure the scene 
(establish perimeters, hot/warm/cold zones), evacuate if necessary, ventilate the structure, or 
other such activities so as to either control/contain the release of materials and ensure that 
personnel and civilians are not exposed to any unnecessary dangers. 
In the event of a false positive, the incident is still deal with in a precautionary fashion with repeat 
and follow-up testing to be certain. 
2. What follow-up steps are taken to avoid the possibility of a false positive or false 
negative?
Further testing with other agencies that have the necessary expertise. 
3. Based on initial incident situation reports, how do first responders in your 
organization choose the appropriate level and type of personal protective 
equipment, instruments and test kits to bring into the field?
Generally they over triage and where the highest level of PPE until they confirm safety of the 
product. The approach is also generally determined by consultation with the CANUTECH 
Emergency Response Guide and depending upon the incident and materials involved, other 
agencies may provide guidance. For example representatives from Chadham labs or the Federal 
Virology lab are often on-site or consulted by telephone to provide guidance in dealing with 
biological agents. 
4. Do you have a procedure for when your testing equipment finds nothing, but it is 
obvious there is something amiss e.g., sick or dead individuals?  
Yes, secure the scene and request the assistance of other agencies with more sophisticated testing 
instruments.
B-9.3 Decision Making 
1. Do you participate in a formal or informal network of ICs in communities, states, 
or regions for information exchange regarding instrumentation or test 
performance, reliability, and utility? 
Yes, we participate on an multi-agency Emergency Planning committee and in a specific working 
group that was established to deal with responses to new types of biological agents such as the 
“white powder” type calls; we have also had a couple of responses lately where it was alleged 
that the individual was culturing e boli and/or flesh eating bacteria. This working group is 
comprised of law enforcement, health authority (public health), federal virology lab, fire 
paramedic service personnel, and provincial department of environment. 
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2. Are specifications for detecting chemical agents standard from a national source 
or do you have the prerogative to select instruments or tests according to your 
specifications?
National source. 
3. Do you have performance or data quality information on your instruments? 
Yes, in-house service and maintenance technicians retain. 
4. Who or what process determines if more in-depth agent analysis is needed at an 
incident scene?
Our IC who in these types of responses will be our Hazardous Materials Coordinator—often 
he/she consults with the other agencies on scene to make this determination. 
5. What is the source of more in-depth analysis? Local, State, Federal, or National 
Lab?
Provincial (Chatham) laboratories and personnel from the federal Virology lab. Winnipeg is 
fortunate to have one of the few Level IV virology labs. 
6. What data are needed to make the decision to get more in depth analysis? What 
more could an instrument provide? 
Data as determined by other on-scene agencies with greater expertise. An instrument could 
provide more product specific information. 
B-9.4 Maintenance and Training Questions 
1. Is there a program in place in your organization for replacement of obsolete 
instrumentation or testing kits and equipment to ensure it is not beyond the 
usable shelf life or to ensure that it is properly maintained?  
Yes.
2. Do you have non-toxic challenge agent materials (effective surrogates) and/or 
quantitative standards to evaluate instrument or test performance on a routine 
basis?
Yes. For hydrocarbon materials only. 
3. Other than users’ manuals, are there training courses for the operation of 
instruments or conduct of tests in your organization and also user proficiency 
standards, demonstrations, or evaluations?
Yes, our equipment technicians and hazardous materials facilitators receive training from the 
equipment manufacturer/supplier. They in turn, train other departmental personnel. 
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4. Do you have the knowledge to provide confidence in choosing instruments or 
tests to have on hand and decide which is appropriate for the situation at hand?  
We seek input from industry/local experts as to which instruments or test to utilize. 
